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¶1 In recent months, conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious liberty have 
leaped to the top of news pages.  Legislatures in several states where same-sex marriage 
has been recognized or proposed have debated how much to protect traditional religious 
organizations and believers who object to participating in or facilitating such marriages.
1
  
Concerns about religious liberty have also figured in the successful campaigns to 




¶2 What exactly are the conflicts?  The prospect that some fear—that a church or 
clergy member could be forced to host or solemnize a same-sex wedding—is very 
unlikely.  But there are many real conflicts.  A wide range of religious non-profits could 
be forced to give direct assistance to marriages or ceremonies that violate their tenets.  
The variety of real and potential cases are discussed in detail in this Article,
3
 but to 
highlight just a couple of examples: Catholic Charities of Boston, a large provider of 
social services in Massachusetts, was told it would be barred from performing adoptions 
in the state unless it agreed to place children in same-sex households;
4
 and a religious 
college that provides married-student housing might violate state law if it refused to 
house same-sex married couples. 
¶3 Marriage ceremonies also affect a host of small businesses—wedding planners, 
photographers, caterers, and others—in which individuals directly lend their personal 
skills to facilitate marriages.  Despite the personal aspect of these services, they are 
classified as public accommodations in many states.  To take just one widely-publicized 
case, an Albuquerque, New Mexico a photographer named Elaine Huguenin had to pay 
                                                 
*
 James L. Oberstar Professor of Law & Public Policy and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, 
University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota).  Thanks to Rob Vischer and Ira Lupu for helpful 
comments, and to Christina Pisani and Joey Orrino for helpful research assistance. 
1
 The states, and the religious-liberty accommodations that have passed, are cataloged in Ira Lupu‘s and 
Robert Tuttle‘s contribution to the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy’s 2009 Symposium, 
―Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Accommodation: Determining the Role of the Legislature.‖  Ira C. 
Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J. L & SOC. POL‘Y 
275, 283–84 nn.43–48 (2010).  
2
 See, e.g., Marc D. Stern, Will Gay Rights Trample Religious Freedom?, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2008, at 
A15 (California debate); Press Release, Stand for Marriage Maine, Stand for Marriage Maine Issues 
Statement About Opposition to Question 1 (Oct. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.standformarriagemaine.com/?p=435 (Maine debate).  The California initiative overturning gay 
marriage, of course, may not survive in court.  See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 4, 2010) (invalidating Proposition 8 as violation of equal protection of laws and right to marry), 
stay granted pending appeal, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010). 
3
 See infra Part III. 
4
 See John Garvey, State Putting Church Out of Adoption Business, B. GLOBE, Mar. 14, 2006, at A15; 
Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, B. GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2006, at A1, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/03/11/catholic_charities_stuns_state_ends_adoptions/. 
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more than $6600 in legal fees for declining to photograph the same-sex commitment 
ceremony of Vanessa Willock and her partner.
5
  
¶4 Both the adoption and photographer cases arose independent of efforts to legalize 
gay marriage; they arose under preexisting laws against sexual-orientation discrimination.  
But for reasons I will detail later in this Article, recognizing same-sex marriage without 
significant religious exemptions will multiply the number of conflicts and create new 
legal exposure for objectors, either immediately or in the long term.
6
  The conflicts put 
real pressures on religious organizations and individuals: Catholic Charities ceased 
providing adoptions in Massachusetts and, for the most part, in San Francisco,
7
 and an 
assessment of more than $6600 is a serious financial burden to a small photographer‘s 
business.  It is likely in the future that religious dissenters, organizations, and individuals, 
will more frequently face a Hobson‘s choice between facilitating same-sex marriages 
against their conscience and giving up their charitable activities or small businesses. 
¶5 In neither of these cases was there any significant effect on the ability of same-sex 
couples to marry, adopt, or otherwise pursue their familial relationships.  In 
Massachusetts, ―[g]ay couples could still adopt through dozens of other private agencies 
or through the state child-welfare services department itself, which places most adoptions 
in the state.‖
 8
  In New Mexico, there was no evidence that Vanessa Willock and her 
partner incurred any costs in finding another wedding photographer.
9
  It seems quite 
possible, therefore, both to recognize civil marriage for same-sex couples and to protect 
religious liberty for many traditionalist dissenters. 
¶6 This Article presents a case for adopting significant religious accommodations for 
objectors to same-sex marriages.  My thesis is that there are important common features 
between the arguments for same-sex civil marriage and those for broad protection of 
religious conscience.  Even though the two are pitted against each other in disputes, the 
strongest features of the case for same-sex civil marriage also make a strong case for 
significant religious-liberty protections for dissenters.  One implication is that there are 
good reasons for recognizing same-sex civil marriage.
10
  But the other implication is that 
if a state makes such recognition, it should enact strong religious accommodations too, as 
a matter of consistency and even-handedness. 
¶7 Among the parallels, both same-sex couples and religious believers claim that their 
conduct stems from commitments central to their identity—love and fidelity to a life 
partner, faithfulness to the moral norms of God—and that they should be able to live 
these commitments in a public way, touching all aspects of their lives.  If gay couples 
                                                 
5
 Decision & Final Order, Willock v. Elane Photography, LLC, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685 (N.M. Hum. Rts. 
Comm. Apr. 9, 2008) [hereinafter Elane HRC Order], available at 
http://volokh.com/files/willockopinion.pdf, aff’d, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. D-202-CV-
200806632 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct. Dec. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Elane Dist. Ct. Op.], available at 
http://www.telladf.org/userdocs/ElanePhotoOrder.pdf (entering summary judgment against a commercial 
photographer for refusing on religious grounds to photograph a same-sex marriage ceremony). 
6
 See infra notes Part III. 
7
 Patricia Wen, California Charity Ends Full Adoptions, B. GLOBE, Aug. 3, 2006, at B2. 
8
 See Dale Carpenter, Let Catholics Discriminate (Mar. 31, 2006), 
http://www.indegayforum.org/news/show/27350.html.  
9
 See Elane HRC Order, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 29, 32 (noting that Willock found another photographer through 
a friend and presented no evidence of actual damages). 
10
 The state may only define civil marriage, of course, not marriage for any religious body—a starting point 
that should be obvious but it is worth reiterating. 
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claim a right beyond private behavior—participation in the social institution of civil 
marriage—so too do religious believers who seek to follow their faith not just in houses 
of worship, but in charitable efforts and in their daily work lives.  Therefore, I argue, 
religious accommodation ought to protect not just churches and clergy, but also religious 
nonprofit organizations like Catholic Charities, and small businesses like the wedding 
photographer providing personal services related to marriage. 
¶8 Accommodation should be made, I argue, unless the religious objector‘s refusal of 
services would cause a concrete hardship on the ability of the same-sex couple to marry.  
This approach will protect religious conscience without causing substantial obstacles to 
marriage for same-sex couples.  In most cases the market will generate willing providers; 
where it will not, for example in some rural areas, the hardship provision should apply.
11
  
If the state presumptively avoids disfavoring or imposing upon religious objectors as well 
as same-sex couples, then both sides can ―live and let live.‖  
¶9 The accommodation standard I defend parallels that of a group of religious liberty 
scholars to which I belong, and which also includes two other participants in this 
symposium, Marc Stern and Robin Wilson.
12
  We have proposed a model religious 
liberty provision to be enacted in states recognizing same-sex marriage, and I will later 
refer to general aspects of this proposal.
13
  But the other members of the group should not 
be held responsible for anything written in this Article.
14
 
¶10 Part I describes conflicts between gay rights and religious liberty that will be 
intensified by recognition of same-sex marriage.  Part II sets forth the common features 
that show that recognition of same-sex marriage claims also demands strong protection 
for religious objectors‘ claims; that Part also argues that the analogy between the claims 
should not be undercut by letting equality values trump liberty values.  Part III sets forth 
the approach for balancing the two competing claims, with periodic references to the 
model religious-accommodation bill; and Part IV addresses some further objections to the 
approach.   
                                                 
11
 See infra Part III.  
12
 See Marc D. Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL‘Y 307 (2010); Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions, 5 NW. J. L. & 
SOC. POL‘Y 318 (2010).  Other members of the group include Professors Carl Esbeck, Edward Gaffney, 
Richard Garnett, and (endorsing our proposals but writing separately) Douglas Laycock. 
13
 Thomas Berg, Memos/Letters on Religious Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage, 
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08/memosletters-on-religious-liberty-and-samesex-
marriage.html (Aug. 2, 2009, 12:59 EST) (cataloging memorandum letters for various states setting forth 
our proposal and supporting analysis).  For references to the proposal, see infra Part III, notes 127–35 and 
accompanying text.  
14
 That is particularly the case with respect to my discussions of recognition of same-sex marriage, an issue 
on which proponents of the religious-liberty proposal hold differing views.  See, e.g., Letter from Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, Thomas C. Berg, Carl H. Esbeck, Richard W. Garnett, Marc D. Stern, & Edward 
McGlynn Gaffney to Sen. Paul A. Sarlo, New Jersey, at 1 n.2 (Dec. 4, 2009), available at 
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08/memosletters-on-religious-liberty-and-samesex-
marriage.html (noting the varying views on same-sex marriage but the consensus on religious liberty). 
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I. THE CONFLICTS 
¶11 Numerous conflicts already exist between gay-rights laws and traditionalist 
religious objectors.  Recognition of same-sex marriage will exacerbate these conflicts.  
Here I give only a brief summary, drawn from more comprehensive surveys.
15
 
¶12 A wide range of religious non-profit organizations—educational, charitable, 
fraternal—could be penalized by regulation for refusing to give direct assistance to 
marriages or ceremonies that violate their tenets.  Penalties may stem from public 
accommodations laws, which in most states prohibit sexual-orientation discrimination, 
and which in many states have expanded well beyond their initial commercial focus to 
cover virtually any organization that offers social services, for profit or not, to the 
―general public.‖16  Religious schools may be subject to separate requirements of 
nondiscrimination in education.  Under either law, a religious college that offers married-
student housing may be liable if it excludes same-sex couples.
17
  Burdens on religious 
organizations may also stem from licensing laws; Catholic Charities would have lost its 
license to perform adoptions in Massachusetts had it not either provided gay adoptions or 
withdrawn itself from the work.
18
  Religiously affiliated marriage-counseling services, 
day-care centers, retreat centers, summer family camps, or family community centers 
might be penalized for refusing to provider services to same-sex couples.
19
 
¶13 As already noted, marriage ceremonies also affect a host of small businesses—
wedding planners, photographers, caterers—in which individuals directly lend their 
personal skills to facilitate marriages.  The Elane Photography
20
 case in New Mexico 
typifies the issues.  The small photography business was deemed a place of public 
accommodation on the basis that it advertised and provided goods and services and was 
thus subject to state anti-discrimination laws.
21
  In another widely publicized case, a 
California gynecologist was held liable for refusing to perform an intrauterine 
insemination for a lesbian couple.
22
  Conflicts concerning same-sex weddings may also 
arise for a number of other religiously affiliated entities that are commercial or on the 
                                                 
15
 See, e.g., Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 1, 1–57 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., & Robin Fretwell 
Wilson eds., 2008) [hereinafter SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY]. 
16
 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(8(J), (K), (N)) (1995) (defining ―place of public 
accommodation‖ to include any ―public or private‖ ―nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate or 
postgraduate school or other place of education,‖ or any ―day-care center, senior citizen center, homeless 
shelter, food bank, adoption agency or other social service center establishment,‖ as well as establishments 
serving the ―general public‖); D.C. CODE § 2-1401.02(24) (2002) (defining ―[p]lace of public 
accommodation‖ to include ―establishments dealing with goods or services of any kind, including, but not 
limited to,‖ a long list including clinics and hospitals). 
17
 Yeshiva University was held liable even for a more general rule excluding unmarried couples, on the 
ground that it had a discriminatory impact on same-sex couples.  Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d 1099 
(N.Y. 2001).  A California religious high school escaped public-accommodations liability for dismissing 
students in a lesbian relationship, but there the state statute covered only ―business establishments.‖  Doe v. 
Cal. Lutheran High Sch. Ass‘n, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 475 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
18
 Garvey, supra note 4, at A15. 
19
 See Stern, supra note 15, at 40. 
20
 See supra note 5. 
21
 Elane Dist. Ct. Op., supra note 5, at ¶ 15. 
22
 N. Coast Women‘s Care Med. Group v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008). 
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commercial/nonprofit line, such as a banquet hall operated by the (Roman Catholic) 
Knights of Columbus or a venue operated according to Orthodox Jewish standards.
23
     
¶14 Conflicts for religious entities may arise not just from regulation, but from the 
denial of government benefits.  Withdrawal of tax-exempt status is one obvious prospect.  
A Methodist meeting ground in Ocean Grove, New Jersey, opened its pavilion for 
weddings, but when it declined a same-sex commitment ceremony, it lost a property tax 
exemption and received a bill for $20,000 in back taxes.
24
  The main tax exemption there 
was for providing wide-open public access to beachfronts, but the principle behind the 
withdrawal could easily extend to a host of religious nonprofits.  If sexual-orientation 
discrimination should be treated in all respects like racial discrimination—as many gay-
rights advocates argue—then the precedent of withdrawing federal tax-exempt status 
from all racially discriminatory charities, upheld in Bob Jones University v. United 
States,
25
 would call for withdrawal from all schools and social service organizations that 
disfavor same-sex relationships.
26
  The Boy Scouts have been excluded from various 
benefits including state-employee charitable campaigns and municipal facilities.
27
  The 
Christian Legal Society and other traditional Christian organizations have been excluded 




¶15 Many of these conflicts arose before gay marriage existed, under antidiscrimination 
laws that apply well beyond the context of gay marriages or civil unions.  For some 
commentators, this means that same-sex marriage will not make conflicts appreciably 
worse, and indeed that gay marriage is being used as an excuse to secure exemption from 
serving homosexuals at all.  Dale Carpenter has commented that ―[i]n most of the cited 
cases, in fact, the couples‘ relationship was not recognized by the state, but adding such a 
status to the cases would change nothing about their legal significance.‖
29
  What gay-
marriage opponents really object to, he adds, ―is the extension of antidiscrimination law 
to gay people—at least insofar as this extension conflicts with someone's claim that their 
religious scruples require them to discriminate against homosexuals.‖
30
  
                                                 
23
 See Stern, supra note 15, at 39–41 (cataloging and discussing ―joint commercial-religious endeavors‖). 
24
  See Bill Bowman, $20G Due in Tax on Boardwalk Pavilion: Exemption Lifted in Rights Dispute, 
ASBURY PARK PRESS, Feb. 23, 2008; Jill P. Capuzzo, Group Loses Tax Break Over Gay Union Issue, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007.  
25
 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
26
 See Jonathan Turley, An Unholy Union: Same-Sex Marriage and the Use of Governmental Programs to 
Penalize Religious Groups with Unpopular Practices, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
supra note 15, at 59–76 (warning of this implication); Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and the 
Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns Against Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY, supra note 15, at 103–121 (warning of this implication). 
27
 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2003) (excluding Boy Scouts from charitable-
contributions campaign); Evans v. City of Berkeley, 129 P.3d 394 (Cal. 2006) (revocation of boat-berth 
subsidy at public marina); Cradle of Liberty Council, v. City of Phila., No. 08-2429, 2008 WL 4399025 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2008) (termination of city lease). 
28
 See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc‘y v. Kane, 319 F. App‘x 645 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding exclusion of the 
Christian Legal Society (CLS) on grounds specific to that school‘s policy), aff’d, Christian Legal Soc‘y v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (upholding exclusion of CLS on ground that school required all groups to 
be open to ―all comers‖); Christian Legal Soc‘y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006) (disapproving 
exclusion of CLS). 
29
 Posting of Dale Carpenter to Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_06_15-
2008_06_21.shtml#1213748649 (June 17, 2008, 20:24 EST). 
30
 Id. 
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¶16 But the recognition of same-sex marriage is an important moment for protecting 
religious liberty even though the conflict extends beyond marriage.  The recognition of 
gay marriage may increase the number of conflicts both directly and indirectly.  One 
likely direct effect will be an increase in the number of same-sex ceremonies and 
therefore, to some extent, the number of ceremonies that traditionalist believers will be 
asked to facilitate.  Same-sex marriage also eliminates an organization‘s argument that it 
discriminates not against homosexual orientation but against all extramarital sexual acts.  
That argument has prevailed in at least one federal appellate opinion.
31
  Thus, at one time 
Catholic Charities in Massachusetts might have taken refuge in a policy of placing 
children for adoption with married couples only—but not after marriage was defined to 
include same-sex couples.  Once a traditionalist organization has to distinguish between 
couples that are legally married, it will be fully subject, perhaps for the first time, to a 
charge of sexual-orientation discrimination.
32
 
¶17 Just as important as immediate effects on marriage disputes may be long-term, 
indirect effects in multiple other contexts from adoption to employment to tax 
exemptions.  Recognition of same-sex marriage with weak religious accommodations 
could spill over to these contexts, in part by generally lowering public regard for the 
liberty of religious traditionalists—but also specifically by weakening defenses under the 
thirty or so state constitutions and statutes that require a compelling interest to overcome 
religious freedom.
33
  With respect to the Elane Photography case in New Mexico, a state 
that has a religious-freedom statute and does not recognize same-sex marriage, Eugene 
Volokh has asked: ―How can New Mexico argue that it has such a compelling interest in 
preventing discrimination based on sexual orientation, when it comes to same-sex 
weddings, when it itself refuses to recognize same-sex weddings?‖
34
  But recognition of 
same-sex marriage eliminates that argument. 
¶18 Instead, recognizing gay marriage without accompanying religious exemptions may 
send the message that the government has a compelling interest in eliminating sexual-
orientation discrimination in all contexts, not just marriage-related ones.  The Supreme 
Court adopted this logic in the Bob Jones case: because the government had prohibited 
race discrimination in public education and many other areas without exceptions for 
religiously motivated discrimination, there was an overriding interest in refusing to allow 
                                                 
31
 Walker, 453 F.3d at 860 (holding that CLS had not violated law school policy against orientation 
discrimination by excluding from membership all ―[t]hose who engage in sexual conduct outside a 
traditional marriage‖ including adultery and fornication). 
32
 The change in status also mattered legally in Maine, where various laws prohibit sexual-orientation 
discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations, education, and the extension of credit, but 
prohibit marital-status discrimination only in the last of these contexts.  See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 
4552 (2005). 
33
 On state versions of RFRA, see, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, 
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 161 (2d ed. 2006).  On state constitutional rulings, see, for example, 
Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State Courts, 10 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 235 (1998). 
34
 Eugene Volokh, Religious Accommodation Statutes and a Right Not to Participate in Same-Sex 
Weddings, http://volokh.com/2009/12/16/religious-accommodation-statutes-and-a-right-not-to-participate-
in-same-sex-weddings/ (Dec. 16, 2009, 16:44 EST); see also Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm., 
165 F.3d 692, 716 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting compelling interest in forcing landlord to rent to unmarried 
couple when ―Alaska law expressly discriminates against unmarried couples in a number of contexts‖) 
(emphasis in original), vacated, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
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a tiny segregationist college to keep its tax-exempt status.
35
  Under this rationale, the 
effects of recognizing same-sex marriage without religious accommodations may range 
far beyond marriage laws.  Catholic Charities could have argued that there was no 
compelling interest in forcing it to serve gay couples because multiple other agencies 
were willing to do so; but that argument is weakened when the state‘s policy stands 
unyieldingly behind the equality of same-sex marriage. 
¶19 Same-sex marriage may not have yet produced a measurable increase in conflicts.  
But it is recognized in only a few states, and is very new in all except Massachusetts.  It 
is also true that the total number of cases between religious objectors and same-sex 
couples has not been huge.  But a modest number of conflicts also means that 
accommodating religious objectors will not pose widespread obstacles to same-sex 
marriages.  Small businesses plainly have incentives to serve gay couples, both to make 
sales and to avoid social disapproval in communities where same-sex relationships are 
protected by the majority.
36
  Religious objectors have moral claims to protection even if 
their numbers are small.  
II. ARGUMENTS IN COMMON 
¶20 Same-sex couples and religious traditionalists clearly clash in a significant range of 
cases.  And yet the two groups have commonalities.  In Douglas Laycock‘s words, they 
make ―parallel and mutually reinforcing claims against the larger society‖: both claim 
―that some aspects of human identity are so fundamental that they should be left to each 
individual, free of all nonessential regulation, even when manifested in conduct.‖
37
  This 
Article unpacks three parallels between the conflicting claims.  Several key arguments 
that have led states to recognize same-sex marriage also call for broad accommodations 
for religious objectors. 
A. Conduct Fundamental to Identity 
¶21 The first commonality is that both same-sex couples and religious objectors argue 
that certain conduct is fundamental to their identity, and that they should be able to 
engage in it free from unnecessary state interference or discouragement.  For same-sex 
couples, the conduct in question is to join personal commitment and fidelity to sexual 
expression—a multi-faceted intimate relation—in a way consistent with one‘s sexual 
orientation.  For religious believers, the conduct is to live and act consistently with the 
demands made by the being that made us and holds the whole world together. 
¶22 Both gay-rights and religious-liberty proponents have had to confront the 
counterargument that their interests involve only conduct, which a democratic state 
presumptively may regulate in order to reflect society‘s predominant values.  Both gay-
marriage and religious-liberty proponents answer that when conduct is fundamental to 
personal identity, the state should weigh that heavily and should not burden, discourage, 
or disfavor the conduct unless it has a strong reason for doing so. 
                                                 
35
 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–04 (1983). 
36
 See infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.   
37
 Douglas Laycock, Afterword, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 15, at 189. 
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¶23 Consider, for example, the court rulings in California and Iowa ordering 
recognition of same-sex marriage under state constitutions.
38
  These decisions had to 
answer two arguments by the states that discrimination against a same-sex relationship 
differs from discrimination against the immutable characteristics, such as race and sex, 
that traditionally trigger heightened equal protection scrutiny.  One argument was that 
pursuit of a same-sex relationship is conduct, not an orientation or other personal 
characteristic; opposite-sex marriage laws are open to persons of both heterosexual and 
homosexual orientations.  The courts rejected this claim, holding that same-sex intimate 
conduct correlates so greatly with same-sex orientation that the discrimination runs 
against the orientation.  The courts‘ rationale rested on the centrality of the conduct to the 
homosexual person‘s identity.  The Iowa Supreme Court said that under opposite-sex-
only marriage laws, ―gay or lesbian individuals cannot simultaneously fulfill their deeply 
felt need for a committed personal relationship, as influenced by their sexual orientation,‖ 
and receive the benefits of civil marriage.
39
  The California Supreme Court reasoned that 
―sexual orientation is not merely a personal characteristic that can be defined in isolation.  
Rather, one's sexual orientation defines the universe of persons with whom one is likely 
to find the satisfying and fulfilling relationships that, for many individuals, comprise an 
essential component of personal identity‖—relationships that encompass sexual behavior 
but also ―nonsexual physical affection between partners, shared goals and values, mutual 
support, and ongoing commitment.‖
40
  The bridge between orientation and conduct, for 
both courts, is the centrality of the conduct to personal identity. 
¶24 The second argument against heightened scrutiny is that sexual orientation may not 
be immutable—a disputed proposition, but one that the two state courts did not reject.
41
  
Instead, the Iowa court adopted heightened scrutiny because orientation, even if not 
strictly immutable, ―may be altered [if at all] only at the expense of significant damage to 
the individual‘s sense of self.‖
42
  Likewise, the California court reasoned that ―because a 
person's sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one's identity, it is not appropriate to 
require a person to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid 
discriminatory treatment.‖
43
  Changing one‘s orientation is burdensome enough that the 
law should not induce or pressure one to do so unless except for strong reasons. 
¶25 State pressures in such sensitive areas—whether through outright coercion or 
through the withholding of important benefits—will tend to cause a series of predictable 
harms.  Those subject to it will experience personal suffering.  They may also react 
angrily, bringing to the surface the social conflict and division already implicit in the 
state‘s rule.  The conflict can be harmful to the social fabric.    
¶26 In short, a crucial step for the courts that have found a right to same-sex marriage 
has been the assertion that comprehensive intimate relationships between two partners, 
opposite-sex or same-sex, are central to people‘s personal identity.  This proposition is 
                                                 
38
 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 893 (Iowa 2009); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2006). 
39
 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 885. 
40
 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 441. 
41
 See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 893 (―[C]ourts need not definitively resolve the nature-versus-nurture debate 
currently raging over the origin of sexual orientation in order to decide plaintiffs' equal protection 
claims.‖); accord In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442. 
42
 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 893. 
43
 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442. 
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crucial to the holdings, not just under the constitutional right to marry but also under 
equal protection analysis, as the foregoing paragraphs have shown. 
¶27 Religious-liberty claims face similar attempts to dismiss them as conduct, subject 
to any and all state regulation.  This time the distinction is with constitutionally protected 
―belief.‖  In its first ruling on the First Amendment‘s guarantee of free exercise of 
religion,
44
 the Supreme Court held in Reynolds v. United States that ―while laws cannot 
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.‖
45
  Several 
decades later, the Court recognized that ―free exercise‖ of religion was not limited to 
belief but included a presumptive right to adhere to religious norms through conduct: 
observance of a Saturday Sabbath as in Sherbert v. Verner,
46
 and education and 
upbringing of Amish children as in Wisconsin v. Yoder.
47
  But the belief-conduct 
distinction reappeared in Employment Division v. Smith,
48
 which held that the 
government may prohibit religiously motivated conduct though ―neutral law[s] of general 
applicability.‖  Although Smith is subject to varying interpretations, under its most 
vigorous reading it holds that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits only those regulations of 
conduct that single out or target conduct motivated by religious belief.  In effect, the 
constitutional objection is to the state‘s focus on belief, not the state‘s effect on conduct.
49
 
¶28 Smith‘s rule for deciding religious-freedom disputes has been rejected by Congress 
in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
50
 and by legislatures or courts in the states that 
have their own religious-freedom statutes or religion-protective constitutional rulings.
51
  
When these are the governing law, religious conduct is still protected from ―substantial‖ 
restriction, even when it is not targeted, subject to an override for ―compelling‖ 
governmental interests.
52
  But even when the compelling-interest test applies, it can be 
eviscerated by interpretation.  Judges have been willing to find many societal interests 
compelling enough to overcome claims for mandatory religious accommodations, or to 




¶29 Limits on mandatory accommodations, however, do not prevent legislatures from 
acting.  There are multiple reasons for legislatures to accommodate religious conduct 
when it is burdened by generally applicable laws, and to make accommodations strong.  
                                                 
44
 U.S. CONST. amend. I (―Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.‖). 
45
 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879). 
46
 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
47
 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
48
 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
49
 The narrower reading of Smith is that it requires that a law be truly generally applicable, not just that it 
not single out religion.  See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(Alito, J.).  
50
 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 
1488, invalidated by Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
51
 See generally Crane, supra note 33. 
52
 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006). 
53
 For catalogs of decisions in which ―burdens‖ were construed narrowly and ―compelling interests‖ 
broadly, see Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 575, 585–97 (1998); James 
A. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 
1407, 1515–29 (1992).  For a more positive empirical assessment of the effects of these phrases, see Amy 
Adamczyk et al., Religious Regulation and the Courts: Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA, 46 J. 
CH. & STATE 237, 250 tbl.1 (2004).   
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The fact that freedom of religion receives explicit protection in all of our constitutions, 
federal and state, is an obvious reason for legislatures to give it great weight.  In addition, 
as a matter of both historical record and current realities, respecting the religious 
practices of individuals and organizations serves as a crucial recognition that the state‘s 
authority is limited to temporal matters.
54
 
¶30 But religious freedom finds significant justification not just in the above factors, 
but also in the importance of religious belief to personal identity.  As Alan Brownstein 
has pointed out, 
For serious believers, religion is one of the most self-defining and 
transformative decisions of human existence.  Religious beliefs affect 
virtually all of the defining decisions of personhood.  They influence 
whom we will marry and what that union represents, the birth of our 
children, our interactions with family members, the way we deal with 
death, the ethics of our professional conduct, and many other aspects of 
our lives.  Almost any other individual decision pales in comparison to the 
serious commitment to religious faith.
55
 
¶31 Douglas Laycock likewise describes how ―beliefs about religion are often of 
extraordinary importance to the individual—important enough to die for, to suffer for, to 
rebel for, to emigrate for, to fight to control the government for.‖
56
  The experience of 
religious suffering and conflict, Laycock observes, was very much in the mind of the 
framing generation, including James Madison when he wrote that ―[t]orrents of blood 
have been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts of the secular arm to extinguish 
Religious discord, by proscribing all difference in Religious opinions,‖ and called for 
―equal and compleat liberty‖ as the ―true remedy.‖
57
  And John Garvey—whose account 
of religious freedom differs from Laycock‘s in resting on the unique normative value of 
religion—still defends accommodation of religious conscience partly on the ground that 
the religious believer will suffer special harms because of the all-encompassing nature of 
religious beliefs.  The religious believer might ―have to choose between violating the law 
and risking [in her view] damnation,‖ or she might ―be forced to forego a great good.‖
58
  
Violating a religious moral code has qualitatively different consequences from violating a 
secular belief, even a deeply felt one: ―The harm threatening the believer is more serious 
(loss of heavenly comforts, not domestic ones) and more lasting (eternal, not 
temporary).‖
59
  Nor is the harm merely consequential.  The objector suffers from having 
                                                 
54
 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1109, 1152 (1990) (The Free Exercise Clause, ―understood as Madison understood it,‖ ―reflected a political 
theory: that government is a subordinate association‖ and that there should be ―a plurality of authorities.‖). 
55
 Alan Brownstein, The Right Not to Be John Garvey, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 807 (1998) (reviewing 
JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996)).  
56
 Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES. 313, 317 (1996) 
[hereinafter Laycock, Religious Liberty]. 
57
 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, ¶11, reprinted in 
MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 33, at 52. 
58
 John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL. ISSUES. 275, 
286 (1996). 
59
 Id. at 287. 
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to disappoint God—from having to live outside of harmony with God—who has created 
and sustained her whole being.
60
   
¶32 Indeed, the centrality and comprehensiveness of a belief in a person‘s identity is a 
key element in the legal definition of it as ―religious.‖   The most widely used modern 
definition of religion in First Amendment cases, developed by Judge Arlin Adams,
 61
 has 
such a focus in two of its three prongs.  Under Adams‘s test, a religion ―addresses 
fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters,‖ 
and it ―is comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief-system as opposed to an isolated 
teaching.‖
62
  Religious beliefs are central to identity because they are or stem from 
commitments to the most fundamental and wide-ranging truths. 
¶33 The importance of religion for the believer, Laycock sums up, generates two 
reasons for accommodating it: reducing social conflict and reducing impositions of 
suffering on people.  The importance of religion to the believer explains ―why 
governmental efforts to impose religious uniformity had been such bloody failures.  But 
this is also an independent reason to leave religion to the people who care about it most, 




¶34 These features of religious belief are certainly no less true for persons who believe 
they must not directly facilitate same-sex intimate relationships.  Evelyn Smith, one of 
several small landlords sued for refusing to rent to unmarried couples, ―believe[d] that 
God will judge her if she permits people to engage in sex outside of marriage in her rental 




¶35 I should emphasize that the arguments in this Article are moral arguments for 
legislative action, not necessarily constitutional arguments for judicial rulings on either 
same-sex marriage or on religious freedom.  Although I oppose Smith‘s rejection of 
constitutionally mandated exemptions,
65
 for present purposes I take it as the settled 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.  I also have serious doubts about courts 
mandating the recognition of same-sex marriage through constitutional rulings.  But those 
doubts stem from conceptions of constitutional interpretation and concerns for judicial 
restraint.  Legislatures are not subject to such concerns when they consider recognizing 
same-sex marriage or accommodating religious objectors.  And both same-sex marriage 
and religious accommodations are supported by the moral claim that the state should 
avoid burdening, discouraging, or disfavoring conduct that is central to personal identity 
unless there are strong reasons for doing so. 
                                                 
60
 I do not claim here that these special harms call for accommodating religious conscience alone, while not 
accommodating secular conscience, only that they justify accommodation of religious conscience, leaving 
aside for these purposes the issue whether to accommodate secular conscience as well. 
61
 See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 
200–07 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring). 
62
 Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032. 
63
 Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 56, at 317.   
64
 Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm‘n, 913 P.2d 909, 912 (1996). 
65
 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then and Now, 2004 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1593, 1606–15 (2004). 
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B. Conduct Lived Out Publicly in Civil Society  
¶36 Related to the first commonality is a second: both same-sex-marriage and religious 
claimants seek to live out their identities in ways that are public in the sense of being 
socially apparent and socially acknowledged. 
¶37 Same-sex couples argue that it is not sufficient merely to be free from criminal 
laws that intrude into the bedroom.
66
  Those who seek to marry have formed family 
bonds with a number of features characteristic of traditional marriage: ―[sexual and] 
nonsexual physical affection, shared goals and values, mutual support, and ongoing 
commitment,‖ as well as, in a substantial number of cases, the shared care and raising of 
children.
67
  They claim that when the state supports such commitments generally through 
the benefits provided by marriage, it should not discourage the commitments in their case 
by excluding them from marriage benefits. 
¶38 Although this claim relies on very personal features of identity, it is far more than a 
claim to be left alone to engage in private, personal behavior.  The claim is public 
because it involves positive government benefits associated with marriage.  As the next 
section details, marriage has public significance as a key institution cultivating virtues on 
which civil society rests.
68
  Marriage is also a fundamental means by which we present 
ourselves to others in society.   Couples state their marriage commitment to each other, 
and are pronounced married, in front of others.  They are identified as married by their 
friends, neighbors, fellow workers, and fellow church or club members, and by many 
other groups and associations—including, of course, the state, which recognizes marriage 
and gives it distinctive treatment in multiple ways.  Marriage pervasively affects how our 
intimate lives interact with the broader society.       
¶39 But something similar is true of religion for its serious adherents.  They cannot live 
out the all-encompassing commitment of belief simply in private worship.  By nature, 
they must also seek to live it in communities and organizations that act in the broader 
society.  They form schools that educate children within the framework of the faith, and 
social services that help people in need as acts of faith.  Vigorous religious freedom 
means vigorous protection for these organizations, not just for congregations and houses 
of worship. 
¶40 Nor can committed religious believers easily leave their faith behind when they 
enter the economic marketplace.  As Eugene Volokh has argued, ―people spend more of 
their waking hours [in the workplace] than anywhere else except (possibly) their homes‖; 
to block religious moral precepts and influences from operating in this arena ―ignores the 
reality of people's social and political lives.‖
69
  I have discussed elsewhere how 
government 
                                                 
66
 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
67
 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441 (Cal. 2006).  The difference lies in the procreation of children, 
or more precisely the natural procreation of the children through the partners‘ own sexual expression of 
love.  I have become very doubtful that this difference alone suffices to justify the differential treatment in 
civil marriage with its dramatic effect on existing same-sex families.  But a full discussion of these 
considerations is outside the scope of this Article.  Although I have come to regard the case for same-sex 
civil marriage as strong, my thesis here is simply that if it is recognized, strong religious accommodation 
should follow too. 
68
 See infra notes 102–10 and accompanying text.  
69
 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1849 (1992).  
Volokh makes these points in the context of workplace religious speech, but the considerations apply as 
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must be careful not to act on the premise, explicit or implicit, that 
―religion should not be part of business affairs.‖  A danger exists, as Judge 
John Noonan has warned, that government will assume ―that human 
beings should worship God on Sundays or some other chosen day and go 
about their business without reference to God the rest of the time.‖  That 
kind of thinking can lead to severe restrictions on the conscience of ―those 
who seek to integrate their lives and to integrate their activities.‖
70
 
Legal rules that say one should not act on religious beliefs in the commercial marketplace 
―make a sharp distinction between the sacred and secular[,  one] that many workers‖—
serious religious believers—―are not willing or able to make.‖
71
 
¶41 The importance of being able to follow one‘s faith in the workplace is recognized 
in two well established legal schemes.  First, Title VII protects people against 
employment discrimination based on their religion, and the prohibition extends to facially 
neutral employer rules as well: when they conflict with an employee‘s religious practice, 
the employer must make a ―reasonable‖ accommodation unless doing so would cause the 
employer or others ―undue hardship.‖
72
 
¶42 Second, as Robin Wilson has detailed, a host of federal and state ―conscience 
clauses‖ protect doctors and other health-care providers from being forced to conduct or 
participate in abortions, and in some cases, in other procedures that violate their 
conscientious beliefs.
73
  Finally, the significance of burdens on religious activity in the 
commercial workplace also partly underlies the Supreme Court's long line of decisions 
forbidding the state to condition unemployment benefits on an individual's engaging in 
work forbidden by her religious beliefs.
74
  These laws and decisions should not be treated 
as isolated cases; they support making similar reasonable accommodations for religious 
conscience in other commercial situations. 
¶43 When same-sex couples are told they will receive no more than toleration of their 
private behavior, they are asked to keep their identities significantly in the closet.  But 
when traditionalist religious believers are told to keep their beliefs to themselves, or that 
it is not proper to follow them in the context of social services or the commercial 
marketplace, they too are told to keep their identities in the closet.  Anyone who takes the 
claims of same-sex couples seriously must also give substantial weight to the claims of 
religious objectors. 
                                                                                                                                                 
well to workplace conduct motivated by religious beliefs (although Volokh himself might not make the 
application). 
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 Thomas C. Berg, Religious Speech in the Workplace: Harassment or Protected Speech?, 22 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL‘Y 959, 963 (1999) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Townley Eng‘g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 625 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (Noonan, J., dissenting)). 
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 Theresa M. Beiner & John M.A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious Employee, 19 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 577, 619–20 (1997). 
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 Civil Rights Act of 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006) (accommodation); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) 
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 Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare 
Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 15, at 77–102. 
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 See Frazee v. Ill. Dep‘t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals 
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¶44 In arguing in these two sections (II.A and II.B) that both same-sex marriage and 
religious liberty rest on claims to live out central features of identity in a public way, I am 
hardly the first to note such parallels.  The California Supreme Court expressly 
analogized same-sex commitment and religious practice in that both are not strictly 
immutable but are central enough to be protected under heightened scrutiny.
75
  Laycock 
has noted the ―parallel and mutually reinforcing‖ nature of the claims.
76
  William 
Eskridge has argued that ―religion and sexual orientation have much in common as 
identity categories,‖
77
 and that when the District of Columbia tried to force Georgetown 
University to give official recognition to a gay/lesbian student group, it threatened to 
―create the same sort of masquerade—a phony identity—that compulsory heterosexuality 
forces upon lesbian, gay, and bisexual people.‖
78
  Eskridge examines in detail the federal 
government‘s campaign, approved by the Supreme Court, to eradicate the Mormon 
Church over polygamy;
79
 he argues ―that antireligious prejudice is systemically similar to 
anti-gay prejudice, and that the religion clauses of the First Amendment as they have 
been developed in the last generation are a model for the state's treatment of sexuality.‖
80
 
¶45 Kenji Yoshino discusses religion as well as sexual orientation as examples of 
features that society may demand be ―covered‖: tolerating them as long as they are kept 
hidden, indeed only because they can be kept hidden.
81
  In addition to Mormons forced to 
alter their polygamist tenets, he mentions Muslims urged to conceal religious traits and 
practices in public and multiple other examples.  He argues that ―despite our frequent 
political differences, religionists and gays share a special bond‖ because ―[i]n fact or in 
the imagination of others, we can engage in [various] forms of assimilation.‖
82
   
¶46 Chai Feldblum emphasizes ―commonalities‖ between gay couples‘ ―identity 
liberty‖ and religious objectors‘ ―belief liberty.‖
83
  Discussing a hypothetical conflict 
between a same-sex couple and an evangelical Christian bed-and-breakfast proprietor, 
she argues that the gay couples‘ identity can be affected by constraints on conduct,
84
 but 
also recognizes on the proprietor‘s side that ―your beliefs and identity simply cannot be 
disaggregated from your conduct‖; she suggests that it is not enough to say that the 
proprietor can still be religious while being forced to serve the gay couple.
85
  (In the end, 
however, Feldblum gives far more weight to the gay-marriage right than the religious-
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 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2006) (―California cases establish that a person's religion 
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 Id. at 2414. 
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 Id. at 168. 
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 Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS 
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original). 
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 Id. at 124. 
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liberty right, as I will discuss.
86
)  In an article criticizing Feldblum, Andrew Koppelman, 
a strong defender of both gay marriage and religious liberty, writes that barring religious 
dissenters from an occupation by the application of antidiscrimination law ―is the kind of 
sanction that is likely to drive [them] into the closet[; a]nd, as gay people know so well, 
the closet is not a healthy place to be.‖
87
 
¶47 The question is what follows from the existence of parallels between the claims.  I 
believe it calls for significant accommodation of religious objections to facilitating same-
sex marriages.     
C. Seeing Virtue Despite Moral Disapproval 
¶48 A third commonality between same-sex marriage and religious-liberty claims that 
has received less attention arises from a different way of looking at civil rights.  Suppose, 
as some theorists argue, that in identifying civil rights we must ask not simply whether a 
given feature or activity is important to an individual, but also whether it is somehow 
good or valuable.  Critics of liberalism such as Michael Sandel and John Garvey would 
say that our conception of freedoms is impoverished and inadequate unless we can 
explain how those freedoms have virtue.  Garvey, for example, argues ―that freedoms 
allow us to engage in certain kinds of actions that are particularly valuable‖: ―[t]he law 
leaves us free to do x because it is a good thing to do x,‖
88 
and ―[w]e value freedoms 
because they allow us to live good lives.‖
89
  Sandel argues that ―rights depend for their 
justification on the moral importance of the ends they serve‖; for example, ―[u]nless there 
were reason to think religious beliefs and practices contribute to morally admirable ways 
of life, the case for a right to religious liberty would be weakened.‖
90
 
¶49 Garvey argues particularly that the basis for protecting a kind of action must be its 
moral value rather than the actor‘s autonomy, the fact that she has chosen it.  Among 
other things, Garvey says, basing freedoms on individual choice cannot explain why 
some actions that people choose get much stronger legal protection than others: for 
example, speech more so than fishing.
91
  Garvey‘s approach puts the good before the 
right—an action‘s goodness is a prerequisite to protecting the freedom to do it—which as 
Garvey remarks ―inverts the first principle of liberalism,‖ the idea ―that the right is prior 
to the good.‖
92
  Likewise, Sandel argues that putting the right prior to the good ―must 
inevitably call into question the status of justice‖ and rights, because ―once it is conceded 
that our conceptions of the good are morally arbitrary‖ rather than capable of moral 
evaluation, ―it becomes difficult to see why‖ it should be so important to have rights ―to 
pursue these arbitrary conceptions ‗as fully as circumstances permit.‘‖
93
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¶50 As applied to same-sex relationships and religiously motivated conduct, the 
approach of Sandel and Garvey would demand identifying something good, some virtue, 
in those activities—as a class if not in individual instances—to warrant protecting them.  
I will not try to resolve or even enter the philosophical debate whether the good is prior to 
the right.  Let me posit only that virtue-based arguments can constitute an important part 
of the case for a given freedom—especially when the arena is political and legislative 
debate, as will usually be the case with same-sex marriage and religious 
accommodations.  If average citizens and legislators are to be convinced to protect an 
activity, it helps greatly to convince them that the activity has some goodness or virtue. 
¶51 The problem for a virtue-based account of civil rights, however, is how it can 
support legal protection for any particular act that the majority thinks is non-virtuous.  
The Catholic Church used to teach that in religious matters ―error has no rights‖: that 
proposition served as a rationale for state favoritism and restrictions, not for religious 
freedom.  If we protect religious freedom or parental rights because of the virtues 
associated with them, why protect religious practices, or parental decisions, that the 
majority thinks are wrong? 
¶52 One answer to this question is that a specific activity may be an instance of a 
broader category that as a whole is good.  Raising children is generally a human good, 
worth respecting even if particular practices are bad.
94
  A slightly different answer is that 
a specific act might deserve protection because, even though not good, it is part of an 
overall pattern of living, by an individual or community, that has virtue others can 
recognize.  A classic example is Wisconsin v. Yoder.
95
  There the Justices protected the 
Amish practice of removing their teenagers from school, even though it ran against the 
strong social norm of compulsory schooling, because it belonged to the overall Amish 
pattern of raising children with ―habits of industry and self-reliance.‖
96
 
¶53 Yoder reflects a longstanding strain in America‘s tradition of religious freedom.  
President George Washington expressed it long ago in a letter to a group of Quakers:  
Your principles and conduct are well known to me; and it is doing the 
people called Quakers no more than justice to say, that (except their 
declining to share with others the burden of the common defense) there is 
no denomination among us, who are more exemplary and useful citizens.  
I assure you very explicitly, that in my opinion the conscientious scruples 
of all men should be treated with great delicacy and tenderness; and it is 
my wish and desire, that the laws may always be as extensively 
accommodated to them, as a due regard to the protection and essential 
interests of the nation may justify and permit.
97
 
Washington was a vigorous proponent of civic republican theory, with its emphasis on 
fostering socially valuable virtues, such as ―honesty, diligence, devotion, public 




 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
96
 Id. at 224. 
97
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spiritedness, patriotism, [and] obedience,‖ among the people.
98
  He thought that religion‘s 
value consisted in its social utility: the moral habits it inculcated were necessary in a free 
society.
99
  How then could he support ―extensiv[e] accommodat[ion]‖ of Quakers and 
other groups that violated social norms?  He did so because the Quakers were generally 
―exemplary and useful citizens,‖ in substantial part because of the same belief system that 
led them to dissent from the norm of providing military service. 
¶54 It seems to me that for the foreseeable future, proponents of same-sex civil 
marriage will have to use an analogous argument: that people who believe homosexual 
conduct to be wrong or less than ideal should nevertheless recognize virtues in committed 
same-sex relationships.  As Chai Feldblum has pointed out, opinion polls suggest that 
between proponents and opponents of gay rights lies ―a significant group of people‖ with 
ambivalent views, who ―do not feel that homosexuality is morally equivalent to 
heterosexuality‖ but ―also do not believe it would be terribly harmful to society if gay 
couples were acknowledged and permitted to have equal rights.‖
100
  She notes that ―an 
enduring half of the American public continues to believe‖ homosexuality is not morally 
equivalent—perhaps viewing it as wrong or an ―unfortunate‖ condition—but that just 
over forty percent say recognizing gay rights would not be harmful (in addition to 
twenty-three percent who say it would be a good thing).
101
  The numbers are likely 
shifting toward greater moral acceptance of homosexuality.  Nevertheless, I think that for 
the foreseeable future, same-sex marriage will only be recognized if it gains support from 
people who still believe that homosexual acts are not morally equivalent to opposite-sex 
acts.  Proponents will likely have to convince many of those people that even if same-sex 
marriages are not morally equivalent, they still bring many of the same social virtues as 
traditional marriages. 
¶55 For example, the California Supreme Court argued that ―gay individuals are fully 
capable of entering into the kind of loving and enduring committed relationships that may 
serve as the foundation of a family and of responsibly caring for and raising children.‖
102
  
The court emphasized at length that the historic social virtues of the two-parent family in 
civil society were   
not only to nurture the young but also to instill the habits required for 
citizenship in a self-governing community.  We have relied on the family 
to teach us to care for others, [and] to moderate . . . self-interest. . . .‘ . . . 
With this perspective, the family in a democratic society not only provides 
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emotional companionship, but is also a principal source of moral and civic 
duty. . . . 
Something about the combined permanence, authority, and love that 
characterize the formal family uniquely makes possible the performance 
of this teaching enterprise.‖
103
 
The court posited that these virtues are taught as fully in ―a stable two-parent‖ same-sex 
household as in a similar opposite-sex household.  It concluded that ―the constitutional 
right to marry simply confirms that‖ such a family relationship, ―supported by the state's 
official recognition and protection, is equally as important for the numerous children in 




¶56 Similar arguments appear in the work of thinkers, such as Andrew Sullivan and 
Jonathan Rauch, who have made a self-consciously ―conservative‖ case for same-sex 
marriage.
105
  They have argued, first, that marriage would help to stabilize the behavior 
of homosexual men, sending social signals drawing them more and more toward 
commitment, mutual care, and even child-rearing.  Rauch calls gay marriage ―not so 
much a civil rights issue as a civil responsibility issue.‖
106
  He argues that extending 
marriage to same-sex couples will promote marriage‘s ―three essential social‖ functions: 
―providing a healthy environment for children (one‘s own and other people‘s), helping 
the young (especially men) settle down and make a home, and providing as many people 
as possible with caregivers.‖
107
  These would help not just gays, but society as a whole, 
he argues, because ―stability and discipline are socially beneficial, even precious,‖ and 




¶57 Rauch and Sullivan add a second argument: without same-sex marriage, society 
will express its increasing tolerance for gay relationships by more and more legitimating 
civil unions, domestic-partnership arrangements, or even cohabitation, all of which 
―really d[o] provide an incentive for the decline of traditional marriage.‖
109
  Rauch writes 
that ―[a]t a time when marriage needs all the support and participation it can get,‖ 
bringing same-sex couples into marriage ―offers the opportunity for a dramatic public 
affirmation that marriage is for everybody and that nothing else is as good.‖
110
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¶58 Such arguments seem likely to be crucial if same-sex civil marriage is to be 
accepted by any significant number of citizens who still regard homosexual behavior as 
less than ideal.  They may disapprove of it but still find in gay families the social virtues 
of commitment, sacrifice, and responsible child-rearing that make marriage an 
indispensable institution.  Gay-marriage proponents seem much more likely to be 
effective if they include such arguments than if they simply argue that gay couples have 
the right to choose marriage.  Liberal arguments are more likely to succeed if they are 
combined with virtue-based, conservative ones. 
¶59 But if gay-marriage proponents call for acknowledging such virtues, they should 
likewise acknowledge virtue in the traditionalist religious organizations with which they 
disagree strongly.  These organizations provide multiple benefits to society that will be 
lost if laws force them out of the provision of services.  Catholic hospitals and health-care 
facilities make up the largest private nonprofit health-care system in the nation, and 
Catholic Charities is the largest provider of social services after the federal 
government.
111
  When Catholic Charities withdrew from facilitating adoptions in 
Massachusetts, the Boston Globe called it ―a tragedy‖ because in the previous twenty 
years the organization had placed for adoption some 720 children, ―many of them 
unwanted or abused,‖ and had particular success ―placing children with difficult physical 
and emotional problems.‖
112
  Evangelical Protestant social-service agencies are also 





¶60  As the experience of Catholic Charities shows, these organizations provide their 
services because of their religious beliefs, and they are quite likely to stop providing them 
if they are forced to contravene their beliefs in doing so.  Thus, if there is an argument 
that failing to recognize gay marriage may deprive marriage of the testimony that gay 
couples could give to its virtues, then there must be as strong an argument that failing to 
accommodate religious freedom may deprive society of multiple social virtues offered by 
religious organizations that have conscientious objections to gay marriage.
114 
D. The Equality Objection to the Analogy 
¶61 Among the most immediate and likely objections to the analogy between same-sex-
marriage and religious-liberty claims is that although both appeal to a liberty norm in 
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preserving space for people to live out their identities, only same-sex marriage can invoke 
the powerful norm of equality.  Same-sex couples, so the argument might go, simply seek 
equal access to civil marriage, while religious-liberty objectors seek exemption from 
presumptively valid, generally applicable laws, a claim that constitutional religious-
freedom law (as set forth in Smith) rejects.
115
 
¶62  In my view, however, the equality claim on the gay-rights side does not undercut 
the analogy or the case for giving strong weight to religious-liberty as well as gay-
marriage claims.  First, looking simply at legal doctrine, equality does not give same-sex 
marriage a trump over religious liberty.  It is true that constitutional free exercise 
challenges to neutral, generally applicable laws do not trigger heightened scrutiny; but 
neither, to this date, do equal-protection challenges to classifications based on 
homosexuality.
116
  As I have already noted, the issue for this Article‘s purposes is what 
measures are called for by fairness and good policy rather than constitutional mandate.
117
  
Legislatures are free both to recognize same-sex marriage and to relieve religious 
objectors of legal burdens stemming from that recognition.
118
 
¶63 Moving beyond constitutional doctrine, whether claims for same-sex marriage rest 
on equality or liberty, they still necessarily appeal to the feature shared with religious-
liberty claims: the importance of the behavior to the individual‘s identity.  As I have 
argued, courts adopting heightened equal protection scrutiny for gay-marriage claims 
have overcome objections precisely by reasoning that the ability to marry someone to 
whom one is attracted is crucial to personal identity (thus same-sex orientation should not 
be disfavored even if it is not strictly immutable, and behavior cannot be separated from 
orientation).
119
  One need not dismiss equality as generally an ―empty‖ idea, always 
dependent on substantive arguments about what features are and are not the same,
120
 in 
order to recognize that the case for same-sex equality in marriage relies on the 
substantive importance to one‘s personal identity of being able to marry according to 
one‘s orientation.  But religious practice is vital to identity too: this commonality holds 
whether the claim is equality or liberty. 
¶64 In any event, equality interests appear on the religious objectors‘ side too.  Gay-
rights laws (in marriage or other contexts) may be facially neutral and generally 
applicable, but like other generally applicable laws their effects fall disproportionately on 
those religious individuals and groups—in this case, religious traditionalists—whose 
practices conflict with them.  Again, even if such disparate burdens are constitutionally 
permitted, legislatures can and should take account of them and make appropriate 
accommodations.  Christian traditionalists can be a minority subject to cultural 
stereotypes and majoritarian impositions.  ―In 1993, 45% of Americans admitted to 
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‗mostly unfavorable‘ or ‗very unfavorable‘ opinions of ‗religious fundamentalists,‘‖
121
 
and ―[i]n 1989, 30% of Americans said they would not like to have ‗religious 
fundamentalists‘ as neighbors. . . .‖
122
  Religious conservatives can be culturally 
dominant in some parts of the country—and impose on gay people there—but they can be 
a minority vulnerable to impositions in other parts of the country, especially those places 
where the majority is most likely to recognize gay marriage and regard traditionalists as 
bigots.
123
   
¶65 The argument of this Article is that the law should to reduce the vulnerability of 
both sides in this conflict, by recognizing same-sex marriage and also enacting 
appropriate religious exemptions.  But if the religious interest deserves any weight, then 
same-sex equality cannot be the dominant value, for as Marc Stern puts it in this 
symposium, ―Equality does not admit of halfway measures.  One is either equal or 
unequal.‖
124
  As one critic of the marriage-plus-exemptions approach puts it: ―To say that 
one supports same-sex marriage, but not a right to marry that is equal to the right straight 
people enjoy, because it is riddled with exceptions and segregated so as not to offend 
traditionalist sensibilities, is a support that exists in theory only.‖
125
 
¶66 Given equality‘s absolute nature, it is hard to see how it can allow for any 
exemptions, even in cases involving strong religious-liberty interests, such as 
employment in religiously significant jobs in religious organizations.  To make it possible 
for both sides to live out their identities, it is necessary to compare the burdens on them.  
Then the question becomes where to strike the balance; the next Part addresses that 
question. 
III.  BALANCING THE CLAIMS: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS 
¶67 What do the commonalities between same-sex-marriage claims and religious-
liberty claims suggest as a means for resolving the conflict between the two?  The 
arguments above provide good reasons for a state to recognize same-sex marriage, but the 
arguments also indicate that the state should provide significant accommodations for 
religious dissenters who conscientiously object to directly and personally facilitating such 
a marriage or ceremony.  It is possible for the state to give both sides in the conflict 
substantial protection, enabling both to live out their deeply rooted identities, 
―uncloseted,‖ free from state interference or discouragement.  For this ―live and let live‖ 
approach to work, same-sex-marriage recognition must be accompanied by strong 
religious accommodations, but accommodation should in turn be overridden if the 
objector‘s refusal to serve would effectively prevent the same-sex couple from receiving 
services and so impose a substantial hardship on their ability to marry. 
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¶68 A group of religious-liberty scholars, including myself,126 has developed a 
proposed model religious-accommodation bill to accompany any state‘s recognition of 
same-sex marriage.
127
  The members of the group hold differing views on whether same-
sex marriage should be recognized in the first place, but we all agree that if recognition 
occurs, strong religious accommodation should accompany it.  Our proposals have 
evolved over recent months, partly in responses to comments and criticisms.  I will 
discuss some key components of our approach here as a vehicle for addressing issues.   
¶69 First, accommodation should extend to a broad range of religious organizations—
well beyond churches that refuse to host weddings (the situation that in so many people‘s 
minds exhausts the set of religious-liberty concerns).  We propose to protect any 
―religious association, educational institution, society, charity, or fraternal organization,‖ 
and any ―individual employed by any of the foregoing organizations, while acting in the 
scope of that employment,‖ from being forced to participate in or promote a marriage to 
which they object.
128
  For the reasons stated above, religious communities and their 
members should be able to carry their faith into the world through education and social 
services and still preserve their identity.  Otherwise the religious community is closeted, 
constricted to live its identity only through private worship. 
¶70 Second, the religious organization‘s claim not to be forced to provide support 
against its conscience extends beyond the marriage ceremony and accompanying events.  
A religious school with tenets against homosexual conduct should not be forced by anti-
discrimination laws to hire a teacher in a same-sex relationship; a religious marriage-
counseling center should not be forced to counsel a same-sex couple.
129
 
¶71 Third, accommodation should extend to some individuals and organizations in the 
commercial context, although the protection should be more limited.  Small businesses 
that provide personal services tend to be direct embodiments of the owner‘s identity.  The 
small landlord may feel direct responsibility for providing the space for intimate conduct 
to which she objects; the wedding photographer may feel direct responsibility for using 
her artistic skills to present in a positive light a marriage to which she objects.  
Accommodation for these objectors, focused on such direct instances of facilitation, is 
sensible.
130
  To refuse to consider any accommodation for commercial objectors is to 
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imply that ―religion should not be part of business affairs‖
131
—at least, that it should have 
so little part that it can offer no counter to the imperative to serve anyone who asks to be 
served.  Without accommodation, there may be severe restrictions on ―those who seek to 
integrate their lives‖ by bringing their faith to bear on their business.
132
  This is improper 
if we recognize, as Part II argues, that living out religious belief is central to personal 
identity. 
¶72 The burden on religious objectors is sometimes shrugged off on the ground that 
they can simply enter another business or profession.  The California Supreme Court, for 
instance, concluded that a conservative Presbyterian landlady who rented four apartments 
did not suffer a ―substantial burden‖ on her religion when she was forbidden to refuse 
renting to an opposite-sex couple because they were unmarried.
133
  The court noted that 
her beliefs did not ―require her to rent apartments,‖ only ―that she not rent to unmarried 
couples,‖ and therefore ―[n]o religious exercise is burdened if she follows the alternative 
course of placing her capital in another investment.‖
134
  Even if only money is involved, 
the court‘s assertion is unconvincing because hasty sales can be costly.  But the stakes 
often go beyond immediate investment, because a person‘s occupation frequently 
embodies skills, training, and a sense of personal accomplishment and identity.  To say 
that being forced to relinquish these does not burden religious freedom is to say that 
religion is separate from one‘s business life. 
¶73 As Douglas Laycock has pointed out, state exclusions from occupations ―have an 
odious history‖: 
 
The English Test Acts and penal laws long excluded Catholics from a 
range of occupations, including . . . solicitors, barristers, notaries, school 
teachers, and most businesses with more th[a]n two apprentices.  These 
occupational exclusions are one of the core historic violations of religious 
liberty, and of course this history was familiar to the American Founders.  
In light of this history, it is simply untenable to say . . . that exclusion from 




¶74 Finally, as part of limits on accommodation in the commercial context, the 
exemption for the professional or small-business service providers should be overridden 
if the objector is in a position to block same-sex couples‘ ability to marry or impose 
substantial obstacles to it.
136
  The ―live and let live‖ approach will not work in cases 
where religious dissenters ―occupy choke points that empower them to prevent same-sex 
couples from living their own values.‖
137
  The possibility of barriers to marriage due to 
market power provides not only a reason for a hardship provision, but also another reason 
for limiting accommodation in the commercial setting to small businesses. 
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¶75 The principle that religious liberty should be overridden only in cases of concrete, 
tangible hardship will handle the large majority of cases.  To reiterate, in none of the 
major disputes above was there evidence that same-sex couples had trouble obtaining 
services from other providers.  In New Mexico, Ms. Willock found another wedding 
photographer based on a friend‘s recommendation; she made no showing of any damages 
from the original refusal.
138
  In the cases involving small landlords in cities with 
ordinances against rental-housing discrimination, there is no evidence that couples had 
any trouble finding alternative housing.
139
  This will likely be true for the great majority 
of objections to same-sex marriages.  Large urban areas, where more than seventy-four 
percent of same-sex couples live,
140
 virtually always have willing commercial providers; 
ordinary market incentives will handle the problem.  In rural areas, where providers are 
fewer and cultural attitudes more conservative, access may sometimes be unavailable.  
That would constitute a hardship.
141
 
¶76 Denials of service do affect gay couples by causing them disturbance, hurt, and 
offense.  While acknowledging that harm, one must also acknowledge, I think, that the 
harm to the objector from legal sanctions is greater and more concrete.  In most cases, the 
offended couple can go to the next entry in the phone book or the Google result.  The 
individual or organization held liable for discrimination, by contrast, must either violate 
the tenets of her (its) faith or else exit the social service, profession, or livelihood in 
which she (it) has invested time, effort, and money.  One simply has not given the 
religious dissenter‘s interest significant weight if one finds that offense or disturbance 
from messages of disapproval are sufficient to override it.  The effects must be more 
concrete and tangible: a practical effect on the ability to marry.  As Andy Koppelman and 
George Dent put it nicely in a forthcoming book, ―actual people should not be harmed for 
the sake of symbolic gestures.‖
142
  
¶77 One implication of that thesis is that gay people should not be kept from adopting 
or from receiving the benefits of civil marriage—denials that concretely affect their 
ability to form families and raise children—for speculative or symbolic reasons.  But 
another implication is that the wedding photographer should not be punished simply 
because the same-sex couple is disturbed, and Catholic Charities should not be driven out 
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of providing adoption services in order to make a symbolic statement about 
nondiscrimination. 
¶78 Professor Feldblum proposes to take seriously both the identity claims of gay 
couples and the belief claims of traditionalists,
143
 but she fails to follow through.  She 
rejects accommodation in every case but a very narrow category where an organization is 
not just religious, not even just engaged in religious teaching, but ―is specifically 
designed to inculcate values in the next generation‖ and ―seek[s] to enroll only 
individuals who wish to be inculcated with such beliefs.‖
144
  Not only small commercial 
businesses, but virtually any religious social service would be unprotected, as would adult 
education programs, and perhaps even schools if they failed to meet strict standards of 
clarity in their advertising.  Feldblum says this approach is necessary so that ―the 
individual who happens upon the enterprise is not surprised by the denial of service,‖ 
which constitutes an ―assault‖ on ―gay people‘s sense of belonging and safety in 
society.‖
145
  Of course there has been terrible violence inflicted on gay persons, and in 
too many places harassment continues on a regular basis.  But the religious organizations 
or individuals whose objections can legitimately be accommodated do not come close to 
committing, let alone endorsing, violence, intimidation, or harassment.  The records in 
cases like Catholic Charities,‘ the wedding photographer‘s, or the small landlord‘s show 
organizations or individuals expressing disapproval of homosexual conduct and seeking 
to avoid what they see as direct facilitation of it.  The experience of direct disapproval 
can be disturbing, but it cannot be equated with reasonable fear of violence or 
harassment—not if we seek to preserve room for the religious objector too.  And as 
others have observed, people cannot be protected from the knowledge that others 
disapprove of their behavior.
146
  Andrew Koppelman puts his finger on the contradiction 
in Feldblum‘s argument: 
The parallels between the burden on gay people and the burden on 
Christians, so nicely drawn at the beginning of the article, have entirely 
disappeared. What about the right of conservative Christians to ―live lives 
of honesty?‖ If they are ―constantly vulnerable‖ to forced association with 
gay people, will this not be ―a deep, intense and tangible hurt‖ to them?
147
 
¶79 A more balanced approach, I think, would focus on the state, which presumptively 
should not deny either same-sex civil marriage or the religious objector‘s ability to refuse 
participation in it.  In his own balancing of the two analogous interests, Professor 
Eskridge argued that such a presumption against state action is too ―facile‖ because 
private discrimination is a problem too: ―The closet that obstructed lesbian and gay 
nomic identity was enforced by institutions of private (corporate) as well as public (state) 
authority.‖
148
  Professor Feldblum, too, proceeds from the premise that private refusals to 
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facilitate same-sex marriage are just as objectionable as state refusals.  Thus, she argues, 
―government necessarily takes a stance on the moral question [of the legitimacy of 
homosexual conduct] every time it fails to affirmatively ensure that gay people can live 
openly, honestly, and safely in society.‖
149
  Accommodation is bound to be grudging if 
every instance of it is seen as a moral slap in the face of gay people. 
¶80 But there are good reasons for focusing on limiting government power.  It is the 
government that can most easily shut down options for either side in the conflict.  It can 
exclude same-sex couples from the benefits of civil marriage, and it can drive religious 
traditionalists from their service work or their livelihood.  In any state friendly enough to 
gay rights to recognize same-sex marriage, private religious objectors will seldom have 
the ability to block gay couples‘ practical access to marriage.  Eskridge himself endorses 
protecting the small landlord on the ground that ―[t]here was no evidence that unmarried 
couples suffered from unusual amounts of discrimination or had trouble finding suitable 
housing‖; ―it is not clear that cohabiting couples are pushed into a closet because of 
substantial discrimination against them in the housing market.‖
150
  In the unusual cases 
where a private entity has the market power to trigger such concrete harms, the hardship 
proviso should apply. 
¶81 In support of her argument that government accommodation of private objectors 
expresses a stance that homosexuality is ―morally problematic,‖ Professor Feldblum 
points out that allowing discrimination against pedophiles and domestic abusers 
expresses moral disapproval of their conduct.
151
  But there is a difference between 
declining entirely to prohibit discrimination against pedophiles —which does reflect a 
moral judgment—and including exemptions in an otherwise general nondiscrimination 
law in order to accommodate a conflicting claim of personal identity.  If everything the 
state does takes a moral side, one cannot explain a sexual-orientation antidiscrimination 
law with significant exemptions except by labeling the state schizophrenic.  It is much 
more plausible to conclude that the state is trying to respect both sides and maintain space 
for both to live out their values.  Feldblum also ignores that the law‘s presumption of at-
will commercial services and employment allows refusals to do business based on a 
whole host of features—from hair color to political affiliation—without condemning any 
of them as ―morally problematic.‖
152
  The at-will rule preserves providers‘ freedom and 
saves legal resources when no strong need for intervention exists.  Society has 
determined, rightly in my view, there is a general need for sexual-orientation 
nondiscrimination laws.  However, in the specific case of religious objectors, 
accommodating them preserves a very important freedom, religious exercise, when the 
need to restrict it is limited because other providers are readily available.      
¶82 In their contribution to this symposium, Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle raise further 
objections to any accommodation of commercial providers.
153
  They reject Title VII‘s 
mandate to accommodate religious employees as a precedent for accommodating 
religious objectors to marriage, on the ground that the costs to gay couples from refusals 
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of service are greater in degree and kind than the costs Title VII imposes on employers.
154
  
Employers, they say, have power ―and access to information that customers do not 
ordinarily possess‖ and thus can assess and mitigate their costs from accommodation, 
while customers can only seek another provider and ―hope that the next one is willing to 
serve them.‖
155
  Moreover, the costs of accommodation fall directly on the same-sex 




¶83 Lupu and Tuttle‘s criticisms, like Feldblum‘s, ultimately reflect a failure to give 
serious weight to the idea that people can carry their faith into the workplace and that the 
state might accommodate this.  The burdens on customers that they find improper or even 
unconstitutional are, once again, ―the dignitary harm of being refused services‖ and ―the 
time and other expense incurred in locating a willing provider.‖
157
  But as I have already 
argued, the latter burdens are frequently minimal and the former, although real, are less 
serious in kind than barring someone from a profession or livelihood.  Lupu and Tuttle 
also find that the costs cannot be sufficiently mitigated by requiring objectors to post 
advance notices of their refusal; they say that the objector must be forced to give the 
customer a list of willing alternative providers
158
—a step that many objectors still regard 
as direct facilitation.  Lupu and Tuttle‘s conclusions are much easier to draw if one 
weighs the religious-conscience interest only weakly in the balance. 
¶84 Lupu and Tuttle give an incomplete description of the comparative equities among 
the parties in the two situations.  In the Title VII context, employers may have 
information advantages, but they also are tied to their employees, whom they cannot 
legally dismiss in order to terminate the dispute.  Other employees in the business 
likewise cannot simply quit their jobs, and the Supreme Court has been especially 
worried about the burdens that they might suffer from an accommodation given to a 
religious fellow employee.
159
  By contrast, customers, including same-sex couples, 
typically have an arm‘s length relationship with providers and can move more easily 
from one to another.  Again, the greatest power imbalance lies between private parties 
and the state, which usually alone has the practical power to bar a same-sex couple from 
marriage—or a religious objector from his livelihood. 
IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
¶85 In this final section, I consider two further objections to accommodations for 
religious objectors. 
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A. Practical Effects and Slippery Slopes  
¶86 Much of the opposition to accommodating religious objectors to same-sex 
marriage, especially in the commercial context, stems from worries about the practical 
consequences of establishing the principle: Will it validate the widespread denial of 
services to gay people overall, or to other groups?
160
  For a number of reasons, I think it 
will do neither.  First, legislative accommodations can be drafted to focus on the 
proprietor or small business providing direct personal services to facilitate a marriage (the 
wedding photographer or florist, the small landlord, the traditionalist marriage 
counselor).  The latest proposal from our group of religious-liberty scholars is so 
focused.
161
  Although I support court-mandated accommodations in appropriate cases, 
legislative accommodations have the advantage of allowing such relatively precise 
drafting.  A specific provision in our proposal answers the objection of Professors Lupu 
and Tuttle that accommodation in the commercial context should not exempt a broad 
range of conduct such as refusal to ―facilitate‖ a marriage in any way.
162
  When the 
exemption is tied to direct personal facilitation of marriage, it is not unprecedented.  It 
fits comfortably with the widely accepted ―conscience clauses‖ that protect refusal to 
participate in or directly facilitate an abortion, another specific form of conduct.
163
 
¶87 Even broader accommodations for religious objectors would still be very unlikely 
to cause large-scale denials of services to gay couples.  It is worth reiterating that 
economic incentives generally cut against such objections, at least in urban areas where 
the large majority of gay couples live.  Moreover, even many traditionalist religious 
believers focus their concern on marriage as a religious institution and the wedding 
ceremony as a religious sacrament.  For them, assisting with a marriage ceremony has a 
religious significance that general commercial services, like serving burgers and driving 
taxis, do not.
164
  Thus they have no objection generally to providing services, but they 
object to directly facilitating a marriage.  And an objector who did refuse broadly to deal 
with gay people—say, refusing to sell groceries to a same-sex couple, or employ a gay 
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person—could not plausibly assert that his objection was specifically to the morality of 
the marriage unless he also asked questions of opposite-sex couples and refused to serve 
or employ them if they were engaged in extramarital sex.  Only with such evidence could 
the objector plausibly claim to be objecting to facilitating immorality directly, rather than 
simply refusing to deal with gay people.  Finally, an override for substantial hardship 
would directly ensure that gay couples are not widely denied services. 
¶88 What about the concern that accommodation in the gay-marriage context will 
create a precedent for accommodation in numerous others?  Professor Maureen Markey 
has asked: 
Could a landlord ask about, assume conduct, or refuse to rent to (or a 
business owner refuse to do business with) someone who did or might do 
or might have done any of the following:  cohabit, practice birth control, 
have an abortion or advocate the right to an abortion, have a child out of 
wedlock, fornicate, commit adultery, get divorced, enter into an interracial 
marriage or relationship, drink alcohol, use drugs, gamble, smoke, eat 
meat, eat pork, eat meat and milk at the same meal, dance, play cards, 
swear or curse, celebrate birthdays and holidays, dress or speak or conduct 
themselves in a suggestive manner . . . ?
165
 
But in the vast majority of these cases, a landlord (or other commercial provider) can 
legally refuse to provide service on the basis of the given behavior.  (The exceptions are 
interracial marriage, which would be protected by racial nondiscrimination laws, and, in 
some jurisdictions, cohabitation or divorce, which might be protected by marital-status 
nondiscrimination laws.)  Private entities enjoy this general freedom of refusal because of 
the presumptions of at-will service provision and employment.  Even when the behavior 
in question is important to a customer, the law commonly allows the business to refuse 
service because of it, on the ground that in a functioning market this will promote net 
freedom because other providers will have an incentive to serve.  The same policy applies 
to the marriage context, where even though the harms from sexual-orientation 
discrimination support legislation in general, the religious freedom of objectors is 
important enough to accommodate in cases where other providers are willing to serve. 
B. The Racism Analogy 
¶89 Finally, I will say just a few words about the argument that discrimination against 
same-sex couples equates in all ways with discrimination against interracial couples and 
therefore cannot be tolerated in social services or the commercial arena (where racial 
discrimination is never tolerated).  There has, of course, been bigotry against gays and 
lesbians similar to the racism and oppression of African-Americans.  The history may 
well be enough, together with other factors, to subject government discrimination against 
gay people to heightened scrutiny—and certainly enough to warrant enactment of sexual-
orientation nondiscrimination laws.  But the issue here is not whether government can 
discriminate against gays, or whether private organizations can do so in the run-of-the-
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mill case.  The issue is whether race discrimination and sexual-orientation are so 
indistinguishable that no accommodation can be made in the case of a person‘s sincere 
religious belief concerning homosexuality—not the belief that he must discriminate 
against gays altogether, but the belief that he must not directly, personally facilitate same-
sex relationships. 
¶90 I would argue that despite the similarities between racial and sexual-orientation 
discrimination, there are several differences.  First, as a matter of constitutional history, 
racial discrimination is unique: it is the only wrong over which we have fought a civil 
war, the only one that resulted in four amendments to the Constitution.
166
  As a matter of 
social history, the movements for same-sex marriage and even gay rights are relatively 
new—while the passage of the race-discrimination laws in the 1960s and ‗70s responded 
to an oppression that continued for more than 100 years after the national charter had 
been amended to prohibit it as wrong.  Dissenting from basic racial equality after that 
century showed an intransigence that bespoke a permanent dismissal of African-
Americans as full humans.  In comparison, the debate about same-sex marriage has just 
begun, in relative terms, and is already producing some shifts in public opinion.  To use 
the law to push one side of the debate out of semi-public settings like social services or 
business is unfair and ill-advised, even if one concludes that side is wrong.  There is a 
serious debate about the relationship of sexuality and procreation to marriage, and about 
the relevance of the ―centuries of tradition—of accumulated social knowledge—which 
the world‘s great religions embody‖ and which almost uniformly has treated marriage as 
a relationship between a man and a woman.
167
  Those are the words of Jonathan Rauch, a 
strong and effective proponent of same-sex marriage, and once again his observations are 
strikingly fair-minded.  One who supports the recognition of same-sex marriage, Rauch 
argues, should still acknowledge that it is ―a big change,‖ and that most opponents of it 
are not bigots but ―are motivated by a sincere desire to do what‘s best for their marriages, 
their children, their society.‖
168 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶91 The very arguments that support recognition of same-sex civil marriage also 
support significant accommodations for religious objectors.  When the personal identity 
claims of both sides conflict, taking both seriously requires comparing the burdens on 
each and weighing them against each other.  With some exceptions, it is more 
burdensome for a religious organization or individual to have to find another service area 
or livelihood than it is for same-sex couples to find another service provider.  In the 
majority of cases, market competition will readily make other providers available.  States 
should therefore recognize strong religious accommodations in the context of facilitation 
of a marriage.  A state that both recognizes same-sex marriage and broadly 
accommodates religious dissenters acts consistently by protecting both parties‘ interests, 
and also stands the greatest chance of reducing social conflict. 
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